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lished by statute in every state.1 These statutes commonly specify
that the proper party to maintain the action is the personal representative of the deceased. This designation has precipitated many
problems where foreign prosecution of the action is sought due to
the common law rule that a personal representative's authority does
not extend beyond the border of the jurisdiction appointing him. 2
The legislatures and courts of the states, faced with these two partially conflicting ideas, have developed various methods to avoid
foreclosing relief because a properly qualified plaintiff could not
be produced in a jurisdiction where the defendant could be sued.
However, the short statute of limitations commonly attached to
such actions makes it imperative to choose correctly the first time,
since before a second action can be instituted with the proper
plaintiff, it may be barred. The purpose of this comment is to
examine the differing solutions and determine the vitality of the
common law rule in wrongful death actions.

I
The original death statute, Lord Campbell's Act in England,3
gave the cause of acti9n to the personal r~presentative, and the
majority of American jurisdicti0ns have followed this example.
However, sixteen states and Hawaii have given the right of action
directly to the beneficiaries4 and in Maryland the suit is prosecuted
by the state.5 Partial changes have been made in other jurisdictions. Two states provide for an action by the beneficiaries if the
deceased was a nonresident, 6 and the Arkansas statute permits an
action by the beneficiaries if there is no personal representative.7
If the personal representative does not institute an action within
PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 710 (1955).
CONFLICT OF LAws R.Es'I'ATEMENT §507 (1934); Goo»ruCH, CoNFLICT OF LAws, 3d ed.,
549 (1949); TIFFANY, DEATH RY A WRONGFUL ACT, 2d ed., 240 (1913).
3 9-10 Viet., c. 93 (1846).
4 California: Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1953) §377; Colorado: Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. (1953) §41-1-1; Delaware: Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 10, §781; Florida: Fla. Stat.
(1955) §768.02; Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. (1937) tit. 105, §105-1302; Hawaii: Hawaii Rev.
Laws (1945) §10486; Idaho: Idaho Code (1948) §5-311; Louisiana: La. Civil Code (Dart,
1945) §2315; Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §1453; Missouri: Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949)
§537.070; Montana: Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (1947) tit. 93, §93-2810; Nevada: Nev. Comp.
Laws (Hillyer, 1929) §8554; North Dakota: N.D. Rev. Code (1943) tit. 32, §32-2103; Tennessee: Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) §8237; Texas: Tex. Civ. Stat. (Vernon, 1952)
art. 4675; Utah: Utah Code Ann. (1953) tit. 78, §78-11-7; Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. (1953) c.
331, §331.04.
5 Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1951) art. 67, §4.
6 Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. (Corrick, 1949) §60-3204; Okla. Stat. (1951) tit. 12, §1054.
7 Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) §27-904.
l
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six months, Pennsylvania authorizes the beneficiaries to do so.8
Since the law of the place of the wrong governs the question of who
is qualified to sue for the wrong, 9 these various types of statutes
solve the problem only when the action is brought for an injury
occurring in a jurisdiction having such a statute. The problem
must still be met as to a cause of action arising in a jurisdiction
which provides for a suit by the personal representative.

II
The Restatement of Conflict of Laws sets forth the common
law rule as follows:
"If the death statute of the state of wrong provides that suit
for the death shall be brought by the personal representative
of the deceased, recovery can be had only by a person qualified
to sue at the forum as personal representative of the deceased."10
It also notes that statutes in some states permit foreign representatives to sue.11 These statutes vary from state to state in requirements, effect, and interpretation.
Three states have defined the term "personal representative,"
as used in the death statute, to include any person to whom letters
testamentary have been granted by a competent authority in any
state.12 However, since it appears in the death statute, this provision has been limited by the New York court to cases where the
cause of action arose in that state and does not allow suit by a foreign representative on a cause arising in a foreign jurisdiction.13
On the other hand, Maryland and Missouri have made provision for suits by foreign personal representatives when the cause
of action arises out of the state.14 Further, twenty jurisdictions
have passed statutes empowering foreign representatives to sue
generally.15 Although these statutes are commonly held to give
8 Rule 2202, Pa. Rules of Civil Procedure, Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1953) tit. 12. For
other wrongful death acts modifying the strict common law rule as to who may sue, see
the statutes cited in note 12 supra.
o CONFLicr OF LAws REsrATEMENT §§391, 394 (1934).
10 Id., §396.
11 Id., §396, comment b.
12Ariz. Code Ann. (1939) §31-102; 13 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, 1944) §130; R.I.
Gen. Laws (1938) c. 477, §1.
13 Baldwin v. Powell, 294 N.Y. 130, 61 N.E. (2d) 412 (1945), reh. den. 294 N.Y. 840,
62 N.E. (2d) 393 (1945). Accord, Wiener v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 298 N.Y. 346,
83 N.E. (2d) 673 (1949).
14 Md. Code Ann. (Flack, 1951) art. 67, §3; Mo. Rev. Stat. (1949) §507.020.
15 Alabama: Ala. Code (1940) tit. 61, §151; Arkansas: Ark. Stat. Ann. (1947) §27-805;
Delaware: Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 12, §1561; District of Columbia: D.C. Code (1951)
tit. 20, §20-505; Florida: Fla. Stat. (1955) §734.30; Georgia: Ga. Code Ann. (1937) tit. 113,
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foreign representatives the right to sue on death actions,16 two
courts have rejected that construction because of the statutory language. The Wisconsin statute authorizes the foreign executor to
"exercise any power over such estate."17 The Wisconsin court has
held that since the death action is not part of the "estate," the
quoted provision does not authorize a foreign representative to sue
thereon.18 However, since the action was brought on the Wisconsin death statute, the court allowed the suit by construing the designation "personal representative" as used therein as broad enough
to include a foreign representative. The Kentucky statute gives
the foreign representative power to recover "debts due to such decedent.''19 In an early decision the Kentucky court said that the
term "debt" could not be construed to include actions for torts.20
However, recently the court, while finding the requirements of the
statute had not been met, expressly refused to pass on the question
of whether the statute applies to death actions.21
Some of these statutes place limitations on the type of foreign
representative authorized to sue. Four states limit the right to the
representative of a deceased who was a nonresident22 and three require the foreign representative to be appointed in the deceased's
domicile.23 Five statutes expressly condition the right on the absence of a locally appointed representative.24
If the foreign representative's right to sue depends on a statute,
he must comply with the requirements established thereby. Al§113-2401; Illinois: DI. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 3, §419; Indiana: Ind. Stat. Ann. (Burns, 1953)
§7-753; Kentucky: Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) §395.170; Minnesota: Minn. Stat. (1953) §573.05;
Mississippi: Miss. Code Ann. (1942) §622; Nebraska: Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) c. 30, §30-807;
New Jersey: N.J. Stat. Ann. (1953) §3A:12-7; New Mexico: N.M. Stat. Ann. (1953) c. 31,
§31-2-9; New York: 13 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1955) §160; Ohio: Ohio
Rev. Code (Baldwin, 1953) §2113.75; Oklahoma: Okla. Stat. (1951) tit. 58, §262; Pennsylvania: Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1950) tit. 20, §320.1101; South Dakota: S.D. Code (1939)
tit. 35, §35.1103; Wisconsin: Wis. Stat. (1953) c. 287, §287.16.
16 Greene v. Goodyear, (D.C. Pa. 1953) 112 F. Supp. 27; St. Louis Southwestern R. Co.
v. Graham, 83 Ark. 61, 102 S.W. 700 (1907); Weaver v. Baltimore &: Ohio R. Co., 21 D.C.
(Mackey 10) 499 (1893); South Carolina R. Co. v. Nix, 68 Ga. 572 (1882).
17 Wis. Stat. (1953) c. 287, §287.16.
18 Robertson v. Chicago, St. Paul, Minneapolis&: Omaha R. Co., 122 Wis. 66, 99 N.W.
433 (1904).
19 Ky. Rev. Stat. (1953) §395.170 (1).
20 Louisville &: Nashville R. Co. v. Brantley's Admr., 96 Ky. 297, 28 S.W. 477 (1894).
21 Vassill's Admr. v. Scarsella, 292 Ky. 153, 166 S.W. (2d) 64 (1942).
22 Ala. Code (1940) tit. 61, §151; Ga. Code Ann. (1937) tit. 113, §113-2401; Ill. Rev.
Stat. (1955) c. 3, §419; 13 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1955) §160.
23 Ga. Code Ann. (1937) tit. 113, §113-2401; N.J. Stat. Ann. (1953) §3A:12-7; 13 N.Y.
Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1955) §160.
24 Ala. Code (1940) tit. 61, §151; Ga. Code Ann. (1937) tit. 113, §113-2401; Ill. Rev.
Stat. (1955) c. 3, §419; Neb. Rev. Stat. (1943) c. 30, §30-807; Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1950)
tit. 20, §320.1101.
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though they vary from statute to statute, they are normally simple,
and are established mainly for the protection of local creditors.
The two most frequent requirements are the filing of a copy of the
foreign appointment and the posting of a bond.25 Delaware requires a bond only if the deceased was indebted to a resident for
a sum of not less than twenty dollars.26 Two states make the requirement for a bond discretionary with the court.27 The District
of Columbia authorizes the probate court to require a bond on
the petition of an interested party.28 Two states have adopted
more detailed requirements. In Pennsylvania, the foreign representative must wait for one month after the death and file an
affidavit that a diligent search has revealed no creditors and that he
is exercising only the powers permitted in the state of his appointment.29 New York requires an affidavit averring that the deceased
was not indebted to a resident of that state and that six months
have elapsed since the death without a petition for ancillary administration being filed. 30
Not all the statutes are designed to expand the common law
jurisdiction of personal representatives. A West Virginia statute
provides that ". . . no person not a resident of this state . . . shall
be appointed or act as executor. . . ." 31 Emphasizing the word
"act," the federal court of appeals ruled that this precluded a death
action by a foreign executor.32 A similar Virginia statute,33 which
had been interpreted as not affecting the foreign representative's
right to sue on a death action,34 was distinguished on the ground
that it lacked the magic word "act." A later amendment to this
statute by the Virginia legislature included that word, and, although a district court avoided its effect,35 the same court of appeals_ has ruled that a suit by a foreign representative is now foreclosed.36

III
The courts also have been adept in circumventing the common
law rule-so much so that it would appear that the exceptions have
:25

E.g., Ala. Code (1940) tit. 61, §151.

26 Del. Code Ann. (1953) tit. 12, §1561.
27 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 3, §419; Okla. Stat. (1951)
28 D.C. Code (1951) tit. 20, §20-505.
29 Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1950) tit. 20, §320.1101.

tit. 58, §262.

so 13 N.Y. Consol. Laws (McKinney, Supp. 1955) §160.
31 W.Va. Code (1955) §4207.
32 Rybolt v. Jarrett, (4th Cir. 1940) 112 F. (2d) 642.
33 Va. Code (1950) tit. 26, §26-59.
34 La May v. Maddox, (D.C. Va. 1946) 68 F. Supp. 25.
35 First Nat. Bank of Amherst v. Fulcher, (D.C. Va. 1954) 119 F. Supp. 759.
36 Holt v. Middlebrook, (4th Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 187.
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swallowed up the rule. The basis for the rule preventing suits by
foreign administrators was the desire to protect local creditors.37
It was feared that foreign representatives would enter a state, collect the deceased's ·assets, and depart from the court's jurisdiction
leaving local creditors unpaid. However, since the benef:i.ciaries
of the wrongful death action are designated by the statute creating
the right of action, the recovery is not generally subject to the deceased's debts.38 Thus, there is no longer any need for protecting
local creditors. The resulting absence of a sound reason for adhering to the rule in death actions has led the courts to seek means
of circumventing it.
The usual method of evading the rule is to say that when a
personal representative sues .on a wrongful death action he is acting
in some capacity other than as an officer of a foreign court. The
capacity most often accorded recognition is that of a "statutory
trui,tee."39 The Pennsylvania court has explained this concept as
follows:
"He [the personal representative suing for wrongful death]
acts, therefore, not by the authority which the probate court
gave him when it granted him the power to administer the
estate of the deceased, but solely by virtue of the· authority
vested in him by statute .... as the representative or trustee of
the parties for whose benefit the action was instituted... .''40
One court has made the administrator the trustee of an express
trust.41 It has also been said that the term as used in the death
statute serves only to designate a person entitled to maintain the
action. 42 By means of these various formulations, the technical
rules usually applied to personal representatives are avoided.
The term "personal representative" as used in the wrongful
death statutes has been held broad enough to include domiciliary,
ancillary, foreign, or domestic administrators. 43 Thus, by statuGOODRICH, CONFLICI' OF LAws; 3d ed., 300 (1949).
e.g.: Iowa Code (1954) §635.9; Tenn. Code Ann. (Williams, 1934) §8236; Boulden
v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 205 Pa. 264, 54 A. 906 (1903). See also Rose, "Foreign Enforcement
of Actions for Wrongful Death," 33 MICH. L. REv. 545 at 592 (1935), where the various
statutes are collected.
39 Siverling v. Lee, (D.C. Mich. 1950) 90 F. Supp. 659; Reed v. Shilcutt, (D.C. Va.
1946) 119 F. Supp. 652; Henkel v. Hood, 49 N.M. 45, 156 P. (2d) 790 (1945); Kerr v.
Basham, 62 S.D. 301, 252 N.W. 853 (1934); Knight v. Moline, East Moline and Waterton
R. Co., 160 Iowa 160, 140 N.W. 839 (1913).
40 Boulden v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 205 Pa. 264 at 270, 54 A. 906 (1903).
41 Memphis & Cincinnati Packet Co. v. Pikey, Admx., 142 Ind. 304, 40 N.E. 527 (1895).
42 McCarty v. New York, L. E. & W. R. Co., (D.C. N.Y. 1894) 62 F. 437.
43 Ghilain v. Couture, 84 N.H. 48, 146 A. 395 (1929); Robertson, Admx. v. Chicago,
St. Paul, Minneapolis & Omaha R. Co., 122 Wis. 66, 99 N.W. 433 (1904).
87

38 See,
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tory construction, the foreign representative is allowed to sue. The
Rhode Island court allowed the foreign administrator to sue because ancillary letters could not be taken out in that state since
the death action does not constitute an "estate."44
The federal district court sitting in Virginia, while recognizing
these various rationales, stated that it preferred to rest its decision
on the fact that there was no reason to deny the right to sue.45 This
was amplified in a recent New York decision:
"The rule barring foreign administrators from our courts
is just and reasonable only if applied in cases, first, where there
are domestic creditors, and, second, where the foreign administrator sues to recover a fund in which such creditors may
share.... With the primary and, perhaps, only reason for the
rule thus removed, the rule itself has no sensible application
and should not be invoked in this class of case."46
The common law rule has not been totally vitiated in its application to wrongful death actions. Three state death statutes
have been interpreted not to allow suits by foreign representatives
on the basis that they are intended to give the cause of action only
to a locally appointed administrator.47 Although the North
Carolina court recognized the possibility of a suit by the personal
representative appointed at the lex loci delecti,4 8 the South Carolina federal district court has expressly rejected the statutory
trustee doctrine and has used language to indicate that a foreign
representative would never be allowed to sue:19 Massachusetts has
also so held where suit was brought under a federal statute giving
the cause of action to the personal representative.50 The cause of
action is, however, considered sufficient to allow ancillary letters
to issue. 51 In one case, a New York appointment was held insufficient to vest a right to sue in Tennessee courts on the Tennessee
statute, but the court allowed amendment of the petition so that
44 Connor v. N.Y., N.H., &: H. R. Co., 28 R.I. 560, 68 A. 481 (1908).
45 Pearson v. Norfolk &: W. Ry. Co., (D.C. Va. 1923) 286 F. 429.
46 Wiener v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 298 N.Y. 346 at 351-352, 83
(1949), noted in 62 HARV. L. REv. 1233 (1949); 48 MICH. L. REv. 520 (1950)

N.E. (2d) 673
(emphasis by
the court). See also Howard v. Pulver, 329 Mich. 415, 45 N.W. (2d) 530 (1951), noted in
50 MICH. L. REv. 148 (1951).
47 Hall v. Southern R. Co., 146 N.C. 345, 59 S.E. 879 (1907); Monfils v. Hazlewood, 218
N.C. 215, 10 S.E. (2d) 673 (1940); Heath v. Smyther, (D.C. S.C. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 1020;
Boutillier v. Wesinger, 322 Mass. 495, 78 N.E. (2d) 195 (1948).
48 Hall v. Southern R. Co., 146 N.C. 345, 59 S.E. 879 (1907).
49 Heath v. Smyther, (D.C. S.C. 1937) 19 F. Supp. 1020.
50 Brown v. Boston &: Maine R. Co., 283 Mass. 192, 186 N.E. 59 (1933).
51 Vance v. Railroad, 138 N.C. 460, 50 S.E. 860 (1905); Boutillier v. Wesinger, 322
Mass. 495, 78 N.E. (2d) 195 (1948).
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the plaintiff could claim as the beneficiary even though the statute
of limitations had run. 52
The courts are not likely to extend these exceptions to those
cases where recovery will go to the estate and be available to the
claims of creditors. Thus, although foreign administrators are
generally allowed to sue in Kansas, 53 this is not true when the recovery would benefit the estate.54 The doctrine announced in
New York in Wiener v. Specific Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 55 would
seem to be limited to those cases where the recovery would not be
liable for the deceased's debts. The Iowa court has expressly
reserved the questi9n where there are creditors who may be injured
by such a suit. 56
It should be noted that there are two situations in which the
problem under discussion may arise: first, where the foreign representative is suing on the statute of the forum, and, secondly,
where he is suing on a foreign statute, either that of the state in
which he was· appointed or a third state. In the latter situation,
the question of whether the forum must enforce the statute of a
foreign jurisdiction57 was decisively answered in Hughes v.
F etter,5 8 in which the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a
Wisconsin statute that barred enforcement of the Illinois cause of
action. A second problem raised in the case of a suit on a wrongful
death statute other than that of the forum is whether a locally appointed representative could sue on the foreign statute. Today it
is generally held that he may.59 The Georgia court found this to
be a logical extension of the statute permitting a foreign representative to sue. 60 It was deemed foolish to have to send a local
representative to a foreign jurisdiction to qualify before allowing
him to sue in the local courts. The Kentucky courts once ruled
that a local administrator could have no rights granted by the laws
of a state other than that of his official domicile. 61 However, a
later decision appears to have held to the contrary. 62 On the other
52 Gogan v. Jones, 197 Tenn. 436, 273 S.W. (2d) 700 (1954).
53 Kent v. Kansas Power & Light Co., (D.C. Kan. 1954) 123 F. Supp. 662.
54 Jones v. Goodman, (D.C. Kan. 1953) 114 F. Supp. 110.
55 298 N.Y. 346, 83 N.E. {2d) 673 (1949).
56 Knight v. Moline, East Moline & Watertown R. Co., 160 Iowa 160, 140 N.W. 839
(1913).
57 Compare Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. II (1880), with Ash v. Baltimore & Ohio
R. Co., 72 Md. 144, 19 A. 643 (1890).
58 341 U.S. 609, 71 S.Ct. 980 (1951).
59 See 85 A.L.R. 1231 (1933), and cases cited therein.
60 Central R. Co. v. Swint, 73 Ga. 651 (1884).
61 Taylor v. The Pennsylvania Co., 78 Ky. 348 (1880).
62Bruce's Admr. v. Cincinnati R. Co., 83 Ky. 174 (1885).
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hand, Rhode Island, as noted above, allowed the foreign representative to sue because a local representative could not be appointed simply on the basis of a cause of action for wrongful
death. 63 The Massachusetts courts allow a local representative to
sue on survival type statutes because the deceased was possessed
of that action at the time of his death, but a death action, being a
new cause of action created in the administrator of the jurisdiction
creating the right, cannot pass to a Massachusetts administrator. 64

IV
Generally speaking, it may be said that the legislatures and
courts are moving toward a freer enforcement of wrongful death
actions, trying to avoid the loss of such actions due to a failure to
produce a proper party plaintiff. Their primary concern is the
granting of relief to the parties designated by the particular statute.
Today, a court faced with the problem as one of first impression would probably have no trouble granting recovery to a foreign
representative if there are no local creditors who would be injured
in the case where the recovery goes to the estate. In those few
states where a contrary rule has been established, a statute will be
necessary. Such a statute need not extend to any action other than
wrongful death and may be so limited that local creditors are sufficiently protected where the recovery goes to the estate, either by
completely denying recovery in such a situation or, preferably, by
requiring a bond conditioned on payment of local creditors. This
would have the desired effect without any countervailing weaknesses.
John M. Webb

Connor v. N.Y., N.H. &: H. R. Co., 28 R.I. 560, 68 A. 481 (1908).
v. New York Central R. Co., 98 Mass. 85 (1867); Higgins v. Central
New England &: Western R. Co., 155 Mass. 176, 29 N.E. 534 (1892).
63

64 Richardson

